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BANKRUPTCY-REMOTE SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES AND
A BUSINESS’S RIGHT TO WAIVE ITS ABILITY TO FILE FOR
BANKRUPTCY
INTRODUCTION
In 2009, General Growth Properties, Inc. (General Growth), a real estate
investment trust that managed hundreds of shopping centers throughout the
United States, filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy.1 General Growth did not
directly own or manage any of its individual properties.2 Rather, it created
hundreds of subsidiaries (special purpose entities) to own and manage each
individual piece of real estate.3
General Growth was structured this way because of the manner in which it
financed its operations. Each special purpose entity (SPE) received a mortgage
loan secured by a piece of property owned by that SPE.4 Many of the banks
lending to the individual SPEs were active in the commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) market.5 These banks pooled the mortgages that they
received from General Growth with similar commercial mortgages and sold
securities to investors that represented the collective rights to payment on those
mortgages.6 A crucial aspect of CMBS financing is that the individual
mortgagors have a low risk of default.7 Lenders based their decision to invest
in General Growth on whether the activity of any particular SPE was likely to
cause it to become insolvent. Thus, the SPE was an attempt by these banks,

1

In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43, 54 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
Id. at 47–48.
3 Id. at 49.
4 Id. at 50.
5 Id.
6 See Patrick D. Dolan, Lender’s Guide to the Securitization of Commercial Mortgage Loans, 115
BANKING L.J. 597, 597 (1998). Note that a similar structure to the type of SPE discussed in this Comment,
sometimes called a special purpose vehicle (SPV), is used during the securitization process. To securitize a
pool of mortgages, the loan originator must transfer the pooled mortgages to a separate entity, which then
issues the securities. When using the term SPE, this Comment is not discussing that entity. For discussion of
the impact of substantive consolidation on that type of SPV, see generally Peter J. Lahny IV, LL.M Thesis,
Asset Securitization: A Discussion of the Traditional Bankruptcy Attacks and an Analysis of the Next Potential
Attack, Substantive Consolidation, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 815 (2001); Michael J. Cohn, Note, Asset
Securitization: How Remote Is Bankruptcy Remote?, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 929 (1998).
7 See generally Georgette C. Poindexter, Subordinated Rolling Equity: Analyzing Real Estate Loan
Default in the Era of Securitization, 50 EMORY L.J. 519, 543–47 (2001).
2
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along with General Growth, to minimize the risk that any individual SPE
would find itself in bankruptcy.8
To make General Growth’s SPEs more attractive to CMBS lenders, the
SPEs were designed to be “bankruptcy-remote.”9 There were various
provisions included in the loan documents of the SPEs that were meant to
ensure that each SPE would only engage in business related to one property,
not incur additional indebtedness, and to file for bankruptcy must acquire the
approval of an independent director that represented the lender’s interest.10
When General Growth filed for bankruptcy, however, it pulled all of its
subsidiaries into bankruptcy with it, including many SPEs that were not in
financial distress and had not defaulted on their loans.11 General Growth’s
intent was to use the cash flow from some of these healthy SPEs to help pay
for its reorganization, which would “preserve value for the [d]ebtors’ estates
and creditors.”12 The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York
denied motions by these SPEs’ debtors to dismiss those cases from bankruptcy
for filing in bad faith.13
The General Growth bankruptcy raises two serious issues about the theory
of bankruptcy law. First, where does the right to file for bankruptcy come
from? It is clear that not every firm is given the right to the protections offered
by the Bankruptcy Code whenever it pleases. For example, there are
requirements that a petition be filed in good faith14 and that a firm have a
8 William McInerney, From Bankruptcy-Remote to Risk-Remote; Reframing the Single-Purpose Entity
in CMBS Finance, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 23, 2010, at 9, available at http://www.cadwalader.com/assets/article/
082310McInerneyNYLJ.pdf.
9 Gen. Growth, 409 B.R. at 49 n.15.
10 Id. at 49.
11 The Prudential Insurance Co. of America’s & Prudential Retirement Insurance & Annuity Co., a
Connecticut corp. f/k/a CIGNA Life Insurance Co.’s: (I) Objection to Debtors’ Motion Requesting (A) Entry
of (i) Interim & Final Orders (a) Authorizing the Debtors’ Use of Cash Collateral & Granting Adequate
Protection Therefore Pursuant to Sections 361 & 363 of the Bankruptcy Code & Bankruptcy Rule 4001, & (b)
Modifying the Automatic Stay, & (ii) a Final Order Authorizing Borrowing With Priority Over Administrative
Expenses & Secured by Liens on Property of the Estates Pursuant to Section 364(c) of the Bankruptcy Code,
& (B) Scheduling a Final Hearing on Each Requested Final Order & (II) Request for (A) Determination that
Certain Debtors are Single Asset Real Estate Debtors, (B) Adequate Protection, (C) Segregation & Accounting
for Its Cash Collateral, (D) Entry of an Order Recognizing the Establishment of All Prerequisites for a Section
507(b) Claim, & (E) Granting Relief from the Automatic Stay or Dismissing Cases of Certain Debtors for
Cause at 3, In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 412 B.R. 122 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09-11977 (ALG))
[hereinafter Prudential Insurance Company’s Objection].
12 Gen. Growth, 409 B.R. at 69 (internal quotation marks omitted).
13 Id. at 56–70.
14 See Robert J. Keach, Solvent Debtors and Myths of Good Faith and Fiduciary Duty, AM. BANKR. INST.
J., Dec./Jan. 2005, at 36, 36.
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legitimate chance at reorganization.15 The SPEs in In re General Growth
Properties, Inc. were allowed to enter bankruptcy even though some were not
in financial distress and were not in default on any obligations.16
Second, why is a firm not allowed to waive the right to file for bankruptcy?
There is a clear rule in bankruptcy law that a waiver of bankruptcy eligibility is
not enforceable.17 However, most courts that discuss the issue do not give a
clear reason why such a waiver is not enforceable.
This Comment will argue, in four parts, that the SPE presents a limited
situation in which bankruptcy courts should enforce a waiver of bankruptcy
eligibility. Specifically, it will argue that a firm’s promise not to file for
bankruptcy should be enforceable if that firm is not insolvent. Part I will
review the three doctrines that led the In re General Growth court to deny the
motions to dismiss the SPEs’ cases from chapter 11.18 Part II will analyze the
15

In re Landing Assocs., Ltd., 157 B.R. 791, 812 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993).
Gen. Growth, 409 B.R at 64 (“There is no contention in these cases that the Subject Debtors were
insolvent at any time.”).
17 Klingman v. Levinson, 831 F.2d 1292, 1296 n.3 (7th Cir. 1987) (“For public policy reasons, a debtor
may not contract away the right to a discharge in bankruptcy.”); Nw. Bank & Trust Co. v. Edwards (In re
Edwards), 439 B.R. 870, 874 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2010) (“For public policy reasons, the right to a discharge in
bankruptcy may not be contracted away.”); Double v. Cole (In re Cole), 428 B.R. 747, 752 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
2009) (“[I]t is not unusual for parties to insert language into contracts whereby one party agrees to waive their
right to discharge through bankruptcy . . . . [W]hatever one party’s reliance on the efficacy of such an
agreement, they are not, as a matter of public policy, enforceable.”); Simmons Capital Advisors, Ltd. v.
Bachinski (In re Bachinski), 393 B.R. 522, 533 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2008) (“[A] prepetition waiver of discharge
entered into in a nonbankruptcy case is unenforceable.”); Marra, Gerstein & Richman v. Kroen (In re Kroen),
280 B.R. 347, 351 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2002) (“[T]he court is impelled to evaluate the mixed fact/law question of
the attorney’s purported justifiable reliance on an oral representation, pre-petition, waiving discharge in
bankruptcy. The fundamental point here is that such waivers are void, offending the policy of promoting a
fresh start for individual debtors.”); In re Madison, 184 B.R. 686, 690 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) (“[A]n
agreement not to file bankruptcy is unenforceable because it violates public policy.”); Freeman v. Freeman (In
re Freeman), 165 B.R. 307, 312 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994) (“An agreement to waive the benefit of a discharge in
bankruptcy is void, as against public policy.”); Alsan Corp. v. DiPierro (In re DiPierro), 69 B.R. 279, 282
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987) (“[T]he court gives no significance to the portion of the [j]udgment [e]ntry
determining that said [j]udgment shall not be dischargeable in bankruptcy. A debtor cannot contract away the
right to a bankruptcy discharge in advance of the bankruptcy filing.”); Markizer v. Economopoulos (In re
Markizer), 66 B.R. 1014, 1018 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986) (“An agreement to waive the benefit of a discharge in
bankruptcy is wholly void, as against public policy.”); Artinian v. Peli (In re Peli), 31 B.R. 952, 956 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1983) (“Agreements waiving the right to file a petition in bankruptcy violate public policy and will
not be given effect.”); In re Tru Block Concrete Prods., Inc., 27 B.R. 486, 492 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1983) (“It is a
well settled principal that an advance agreement to waive the benefits conferred by the bankruptcy laws is
wholly void as against public policy.”); Johnson v. Kriger (In re Kriger), 2 B.R. 19, 23 (Bankr. D. Or. 1979)
(“It is a well settled principle that an advance agreement to waive the benefit of a discharge in bankruptcy is
wholly void, as against public policy.”).
18 Gen. Growth, 409 B.R 43.
16
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SPE structure and the In re General Growth decision in detail. Part III will
review the scholarly literature on contracting around bankruptcy, giving
particular attention to two arguments commonly advanced as reasons that a
firm should not be able to waive its right to bankruptcy or significantly alter its
bankruptcy rights. This Comment will then argue that the SPEs in In re
General Growth present an example of cases where bankruptcy courts should
relax the rule that waivers of bankruptcy eligibility are generally nonenforceable.
PART I
Three doctrines are relevant to the decision in In re General Growth:
substantive consolidation, the requirement that a petition by filed in good faith,
and the nonenforceability of the promise not to file bankruptcy. This Comment
contends that these three doctrines overlap to produce a questionable result.
Specifically, the hesitance of bankruptcy courts to dismiss a petition for “bad
faith,” combined with their refusal to enforce a waiver of the right to file,
presents a situation where solvent firms that have contracted with lenders to
avoid bankruptcy have been allowed to file regardless. This is exactly what
happened in In re General Growth.19
A. Substantive Consolidation
Substantive consolidation is an equitable doctrine by which courts treat
separate entities as if they were one for the purpose of bankruptcy
proceedings.20 There is no statutory authority for the doctrine; rather, it is “a
product of judicial gloss” fashioned by courts “to ensure the equitable
treatment of all creditors.”21 The early history of substantive consolidation
shows three types of cases in which courts applied the doctrine.

19

See id. at 55–70.
See generally Dennis J. Connolly, John C. Weitnauer & Jonathan T. Edwards, Current Approaches to
Substantive Consolidation: Owens Corning Revisited, 2009 NORTON ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 27 (2009);
William H. Widen, The Reality of Substantive Consolidation, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July/Aug. 2007, at 14;
Lahny, supra note 6; William C. Blasses, Comment, Redefining into Reality: Substantive Consolidation of
Parent Corporations and Subsidiaries, 24 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 469 (2008).
21 Ryan E. Scharar, Comment, The Limits of Securitization: Why Bankruptcy Courts Should
Substantively Consolidate Predatory Sub-Prime Mortgage Originators and Their Special Purpose Entities,
2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 913, 930 (2009) (quoting Union Sav. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co. (In re
Augie/Restivo Baking Co.), 860 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
20
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First, there were cases in which one corporation was a “mere
instrumentality” of another and in which it was “logical and convenient” to
treat the corporation and the subsidiary as the same entity.22
Second, there were cases in which bankruptcy courts applied substantive
consolidation to prevent debtors from making fraudulent transfers intended to
protect their wealth from the bankruptcy estate. For example, in Sampsell v.
Imperial Paper & Color Corp.,23 the debtor was doing business as an
individual and incurred over $100,000 in debt.24 Shortly after incurring this
debt, the debtor transferred his stock of goods to a corporation of which only
he, his wife, and their children were directors, officers, or stockholders.25 Since
the corporation was not formed until the debtor was hopelessly insolvent, the
Court found that it was “a sham and a cloak” designed merely to shield the
debtor’s assets from his creditors in bankruptcy.26
Third, courts have applied substantive consolidation in cases in which the
assets of several debtors are so “hopelessly obscured” that the accounting costs
of sorting out the assets would be high enough to reduce the amount available
for creditors to recover.27
Sampsell represents the early history of substantive consolidation, but the
tests that courts use in applying the doctrine have changed since that decision
was rendered almost seventy years ago. There is no single test that courts apply
to determine whether substantive consolidation is appropriate in any given set
of circumstances.28 Different courts have fashioned different tests, and each
case is decided by looking at the totality of the circumstances.29 However, the
two tests most often applied30 are the two-factor test, used in Union S Savings

22 Christopher J. Predko, Substantive Consolidation Involving Non-Debtors: Conceptual and
Jurisdictional Difficulties in Bankruptcy, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 1741, 1745–46 (1995) (quoting Stone v. Eacho
(In re Tip Top Tailors, Inc.), 127 F.2d 284, 288–89 (4th Cir. 1942)) (internal quotation marks omitted). For a
more detailed history of substantive consolidation, see Lahny, supra note 6.
23 Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215 (1941). Some scholars have argued that
Sampsell is the “seminal case” in the area of substantive consolidation. Lahny, supra note 6, at 866.
24 Sampsell, 313 U.S. at 215.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 217 (internal quotation marks omitted).
27 See In re Bonham, 226 B.R. 56, 79–80 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1998) (quoting Chem. Bank N.Y. Trust Co.
v. Kheel (In re Seatrade Corp.), 369 F.2d 845, 847 (2d Cir. 1966)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
28 Predko, supra note 22, at 1750.
29 Id.
30 See Alexander v. Compton (In re Bonham), 229 F.3d 750, 765–66 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Two ‘similar but
not identical’ tests have been applied to assess whether substantive consolidation is proper, neither of which
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Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co.)31 and the
three-part, burden-shifting test, followed in Drabkin v. Midland-Ross Corp. (In
re Auto-Train Corp.).32
In In re Augie/Restivo Baking, the court noted that although different courts
had pointed to “[n]umerous considerations” to determine whether applying
substantive consolidation would be equitable to all creditors, most of these
considerations are simply variants on two important factors.33 The first factor
is “whether creditors dealt with the entities as a single economic unit and ‘did
not rely on their separate identity in extending credit.’”34 The second factor is
whether “the affairs of the debtors are so entangled that consolidation will
benefit all creditors.”35
In In re Auto-Train, the court applied a three-part test.36 First, the
proponent of consolidation must show “a substantial identity between the
entities to be consolidated,” and “that consolidation is necessary to avoid some
harm or to realize some benefit.”37 Next, if the proponent demonstrates these
two elements, then the creditor may rebut “on the grounds that it relied on the
separate credit of one of the entities and that it will be prejudiced by the
consolidation.”38 Finally, if the creditor demonstrates this, then the court
should consolidate only if the benefits of consolidation “heavily outweigh the
harm.”39
In In re General Growth, the parent corporation, General Growth,
indirectly owned and managed properties throughout the United States via
hundreds of subsidiaries.40 General Growth was structured this way because it

we have had occasion to apply or adopt.” (quoting Reider v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re Reider), 31 F.3d
1102, 1107 (11th Cir. 1994)).
31 Union Sav. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co.), 860 F.2d 515, 518
(2d Cir. 1988); see also Reider, 31 F.3d at 1108; In re 599 Consumer Elecs., Inc., 195 B.R. 244, 248 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); In re Standard Brands Paint Co., 154 B.R. 563, 569 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993).
32 Drabkin v. Midland-Ross Corp. (In re Auto-Train Corp.), 810 F.2d 270, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
33 Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 860 F.2d at 518.
34 Id. (quoting 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1100.06[1] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1996)).
35 Id.
36 Auto-Train, 810 F.2d at 276. For additional discussion regarding the three-part test, see also Simon v.
ASIMCO Techs., Inc. (In re American Camshaft Specialties, Inc.), 410 B.R. 765, 780 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
2009); Saccurato v. Shawmut Bank, N.A. (In re Mars Stores, Inc.), 150 B.R. 869, 879 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993).
37 Auto-Train, 810 F.2d at 276.
38 Id.
39 Id. (quoting James Talcott, Inc. v. Wharton (In re Cont’l Vending Mach. Corp.), 517 F.2d 997, 1001
(2d Cir. 1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
40 In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43, 47–48 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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financed its operations by organizing the subsidiaries as bankruptcy-remote
SPEs.41 Thus, the subsidiaries could more easily obtain credit because lenders
felt secure that their finances would not become intertwined with the larger
parent company.42
The General Growth bankruptcy was not a good candidate for substantive
consolidation. An SPE’s status as an independent economic unit is the entire
basis on which the lender chooses to extend credit. Moreover, treating General
Growth as a single entity was certainly not beneficial to all creditors, as many
of them vehemently protested the inclusion of the SPEs in General Growth’s
filing.43 Once the SPEs were allowed to file, the court entered cash collateral
orders that allowed the SPEs to “upstream cash from the individual properties
for use at the parent-level entity.”44 Thus, some creditors extended credit to
individual SPEs in exchange for the promise that those SPEs would not
commingle assets with any other entity or engage in any business besides
managing collateral for the loan, only to see a bankruptcy court allow the SPEs
essentially to make intercompany loans to their parent entity in bankruptcy.
The court expressly rejected the idea that it was applying the doctrine of
substantive consolidation and claimed that it was merely consolidating the
proceedings for administrative convenience, stating:
The salient point for purposes of these [m]otions is that the
fundamental protections that the [m]ovants negotiated and that the
SPE structure represents are still in place and will remain in place
during the [c]hapter 11 cases. This includes protection against the
substantive consolidation of the project-level [d]ebtors with any other
entities. There is no question that a principal goal of the SPE
structure is to guard against substantive consolidation, but the
question of substantive consolidation is entirely different from the
issue whether the [b]oard of a debtor that is part of a corporate group
can consider the interests of the group along with the interests of the
individual debtor when making a decision to file a bankruptcy case.45

The court accurately pointed out that the estates of the SPEs were still
technically separate from the estate of General Growth and that this decision

41

Id. at 51.
David B. Stratton, Special-Purpose Entities and Authority To File Bankruptcy, AM. BANKR. INST. J.
Mar. 2004, at 36, 36.
43 Prudential Insurance Company’s Objection, supra note 11, at 5.
44 Gen. Growth, 409 B.R. at 55.
45 Id. at 69.
42
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merely allowed the SPEs to enter bankruptcy and form their own estates.46
While the court’s point may be correct as a technical matter, it seems hard to
square the assertion that the court was not applying substantive consolidation
with its statement that it would allow separate entities to consider the interests
of each other for the purpose of deciding whether to file a bankruptcy
proceeding.47 At least one creditor in its filings accused the court of applying a
form of “de facto substantive consolidation.”48
De facto substantive consolidation is a fair characterization of the court’s
decision to allow the project-level debtors to consider the interests of General
Growth as a whole when filing for bankruptcy.49 One of the reasons that
General Growth wanted its SPEs to enter bankruptcy was so that it could use
their cash collateral to help fund its reorganization.50 Thus, the lenders’
purpose in requiring that the SPEs promise not to incur other financial
obligations or debt unrelated to managing the collateral for the loan was
frustrated, even if the bankruptcy estates of the SPEs technically remained
separate from the estate of General Growth. It is not clear how the court could
deny the lenders’ motions to dismiss the SPEs’ bankruptcy cases and still make
the assertion that “the fundamental protections that the [m]ovants negotiated
and that the SPE structure represents are still in place,” when keeping those
SPEs out of bankruptcy was the exact protection for which the lenders thought
they were negotiating.51
B. A Corporation May Not Waive Its Right to Enter Bankruptcy
There is a longstanding tradition in bankruptcy law that one cannot waive
the right to file for bankruptcy.52 One of the earliest cases espousing this

46

Id.
Id.
48 Prudential Insurance Company’s Objection, supra note 11, at 3.
49 See Gen. Growth, 409 B.R. 43.
50 See id. at 55; see also In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 412 B.R. 122, 125–26 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
51 Gen. Growth, 409 B.R. at 69.
52 Klingman v. Levinson, 831 F.2d 1292, 1296 n.3 (7th Cir. 1987); Fallick v. Kehr (In re Fallick), 369
F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir. 1966); In re Weitzen, 3 F. Supp. 698, 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1933); Nw. Bank & Trust Co. v.
Edwards (In re Edwards), 439 B.R. 870, 874 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2010); Double v. Cole (In re Cole), 428 B.R.
747, 752 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2009); Simmons Capital Advisors, Ltd. v. Bachinski (In re Bachinski), 393 B.R.
522, 533–34 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2008); Marra, Gerstein & Richman v. Kroen (In re Kroen), 280 B.R. 347,
351–52 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2002); In re Madison, 184 B.R. 686, 690 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995); Freeman v. Freeman
(In re Freeman), 165 B.R. 307, 312 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994); Alsan Corp. v. DiPierro (In re DiPierro), 69 B.R.
279, 282 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987); Markizer v. Economopoulos (In re Markizer), 66 B.R. 1014, 1018 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1986); Artinian v. Peli (In re Peli), 31 B.R. 952, 956 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Tru Block
47
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principle is In re Weitzen, which was decided in 1933.53 In that decision, a
court laid out the rationale for the rule:
The agreement to waive the benefit of bankruptcy is unenforceable.
To sustain a contractual obligation of this character would frustrate
the object of the Bankruptcy Act, particularly of section 17. This was
held by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, where it was
said: “It would be repugnant to the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to
permit the circumvention of its object by the simple device of a
clause in the agreement, out of which the provable debt springs,
stipulating that a discharge in bankruptcy will not be pleaded by the
debtor. The Bankruptcy Act would in the natural course of business
be nullified in the vast majority of debts arising out of contracts, if
this were permissible. It would be vain to enact a bankruptcy law
with all its elaborate machinery for settlement of the estates of
bankrupt debtors, which could so easily be rendered of no effect. The
bar of the discharge under the terms of the Bankruptcy Act is not
restricted to those instances where the debtor has not waived his right
to plead it. It is universal and unqualified in terms. It affects all debts
within the scope of its words. It would be contrary to the letter of
section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act as we interpret it to uphold the
waiver embodied in this note. So to do would be incompatible with
the spirit of that section. Its aim would largely be defeated.”54

This reasoning is consistent with most decisions that discuss the issue.
Courts routinely refuse to enforce waivers of the right to file bankruptcy on the
grounds that such waivers frustrate the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code (or
former Act), or that they are void against “public policy.”55 Some courts have
gone so far as to find that such waivers are unenforceable because there is a
constitutional right to file for bankruptcy.56 However, this argument has been
rejected for multiple reasons: the Constitution does not require Congress to

Concrete Prods., Inc., 27 B.R. 486, 492 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1983); Johnson v. Kriger (In re Kriger), 2 B.R. 19,
23 (Bankr. D. Or. 1979).
53 Weitzen, 3 F. Supp. at 698–99.
54 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Federal Nat’l Bank v. Koppel, 148 N.E. 379, 380 (Mass. 1925)).
55 See supra note 17.
56 Thomas G. Kelch & Michael K. Slattery, The Mythology of Waivers of Bankruptcy Privileges, 31 IND.
L. REV. 897, 900 (1998) (citing Merritt v. Mt. Forest Fur Farms of Am., Inc. (In re Mt. Forest Fur Farms of
Am., Inc.), 103 F.2d 69, 71 (6th Cir. 1939); In re Pine Tree Feed Co., 112 F. Supp. 124, 126 (D. Me. 1953); In
re Citadel Props., Inc., 86 B.R. 275, 276 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988); In re Adana Mortg. Bankers, Inc., 12 B.R.
989, 1009 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980), vacated sub nom. Gov’t Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Adana Mortg. Bankers, Inc.
(In re Adana Mortg. Bankers, Inc.), 687 F.2d 344 (11th Cir. 1982)).
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make bankruptcy laws at all, and individuals are allowed to waive other
constitutional rights, such as those governed by the Fifth Amendment.57
In the case of individuals, the public policy goals in refusing to enforce
bankruptcy waivers are clear. The justification that an individual is entitled to
be free from the burdens of debt and have a chance to wipe the slate clean is
often referred to as the “fresh start” policy.58 The purpose behind the fresh start
policy is to “relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive
indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and
responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes.”59 Courts have refused
to enforce a waiver of the right to file bankruptcy because of the social
consequences of being a debtor with no hope of returning to solvency.60 There
are humanitarian reasons for allowing an individual to file for bankruptcy.61 At
least one scholar has even gone so far as to say that the reasons for allowing
discharge to individual debtors are purely moral.62 Being hopelessly insolvent
can impair a person’s ability to buy a house, lease a car, maintain a job, and
generally advance in society. One of the purposes of bankruptcy law is to limit
negative social consequences of being a debtor,63 and allowing an individual to
alter or waive the ability to file bankruptcy would frustrate that purpose.
To the extent that humanitarian reasons for the fresh start policy are
unconvincing, there is also the concern that an individual saddled with debt
will have no reason to actively participate in the economy.64 If one knows that

57 Id. at 900; Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 515, 539 (1999).
58 Irby v. Preferred Credit (In re Irby), 359 B.R. 859, 861 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007); Kelch & Slattery,
supra note 56, at 905; Marshall E. Tracht, Contractual Bankruptcy Waivers: Reconciling Theory, Practice,
and Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 301, 307–08 (1997). See generally Charles G. Hallinan, The “Fresh Start”
Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Historical Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 49
(1986). Not all scholars accept the fresh start policy as grounds for the right to declare bankruptcy. For a
critique of the policy, see generally F.H. Buckley, The American Fresh Start, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 67
(1995).
59 Robert C. Yan, Note, The Sign Says “Help Wanted, Inquire Within”—But It May Not Matter if You
Have Ever Filed (or Plan To File) for Bankruptcy, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 429, 433 (2002) (quoting
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244–45 (1934)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
60 Tracht, supra note 58, at 307–08.
61 See Richard E. Flint, Bankruptcy Policy: Toward a Moral Justification for Financial Rehabilitation of
the Consumer Debtor, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 515, 517–21 (1991); Tracht, supra note 58, at 307–08.
62 Flint, supra note 61, at 519–21.
63 See Otis B. Grant, Are the Indigent Too Poor for Bankruptcy? A Critical Legal Interpretation of the
Theory of a Fresh Start Within a Law and Economics Paradigm, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 773, 778 (2002).
64 See Tracht, supra note 58, at 307–08.
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creditors will immediately seize the fruits of one’s labor, then one will shut
down economically, having lost the incentive to produce income.65
These seem to be valid reasons for preventing the waiver of an individual’s
right to file, but the “fresh start” policy that applies to individual debtors does
not apply to businesses.66 There are no humanitarian concerns when it comes
to the debt of a business, as businesses can be sold off or shut down if they are
no longer economically viable. However, courts will not enforce bankruptcy
waivers by businesses.67
The decision in In re General Growth raises the issue of the right of a
business to waive or alter its ability to file bankruptcy through contract.
Presumably, if the parties believed that such a waiver would be enforceable,
the lenders would simply have insisted that the debtors organize as a separate
entity that did not have the ability to enter bankruptcy instead of coming up
with an elaborate scheme of separateness covenants and independent directors
to achieve bankruptcy-remote status. If such a mechanism were available, then
the SPEs’ lenders would have been even more sure that the SPEs would not
end up in bankruptcy. Moreover, the court dismissed the argument that the
creditors’ rights were impaired by allowing the SPEs to enter bankruptcy.68
The court held that the independent managers’ fiduciary duty to the creditors
was superseded by their promise to consider the interests of the company as a
whole.69 Moreover, the court made it clear that it was appropriate for the SPEs,
which were organized specifically to be separate from General Growth, to
consider themselves part of the larger “corporate group” when making a
decision to file.70 This court is not alone in refusing to allow entities to use the
SPE structure to limit their ability to enter bankruptcy.71

65

Id.
Id.
67 United States v. Royal Bus. Funds Corp., 24 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1983) (“We by no means intend to
disturb the general rules that a debtor may not agree to waive the right to file a bankruptcy petition . . . .”); In
re Tru Block Concrete Prods., Inc., 27 B.R. 486, 492 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1983) (“It is a well settled principal
that an advance agreement to waive the benefits conferred by the bankruptcy laws is wholly void as against
public policy.”); Tracht, supra note 58, at 307 (citing Tru Block Concrete, 27 B.R. at 492).
68 In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43, 69 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
69 Id. at 63–64.
70 Id. at 69.
71 Sheri P. Chromow & K.C. McDaniel, Surviving a CMBS Bankruptcy, in MODERN REAL EST.
TRANSACTIONS 747, 754 (ALI-ABA Continuing Legal Education, Course of Study No. SJ004, 2003) (“Case
law has rejected the idea of limiting the power of directors or requiring them to refuse a vote in favor of
bankruptcy.”).
66
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C. The Good Faith Filing Requirement
Not every business that files for bankruptcy is insolvent. There are many
instances where solvent businesses enter bankruptcy because they believe that
they are on the brink of financial distress, or that some impending event will
cause them to become insolvent.72 One of the reasons for this is the Code’s
policy of keeping the barriers to bankruptcy low.73
A showing of insolvency is not required for a business to enter
bankruptcy.74 There is a concern that if businesses were forced to demonstrate
insolvency before being allowed access to the bankruptcy system, then many
firms would have to wait to file until they were hopelessly insolvent,
precluding a realistic chance that they could be reorganized successfully.75 In
the case of large corporations, it can be difficult and expensive to value the
assets and liabilities to get a clear determination of whether the corporation is
insolvent, and courts feel that such a determination is better left to the
corporation’s directors than to judges.76 Additionally, solvent firms may wish
to take advantage of some of the provisions of the Code that are not available

72 Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416, 423 (1972) (“Chapter X proceedings are not
limited to insolvent corporations . . . .”); United States v. Huebner, 48 F.3d 376, 379 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The
Bankruptcy Act does not require any particular degree of financial distress as a condition precedent to a
petition seeking relief.”); In re James Wilson Assocs., 965 F.2d 160, 170 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he Bankruptcy
Code permits an individual or firm that has debts to declare bankruptcy even though he (or it) is not
insolvent.”); Connell v. Coastal Cable T.V., Inc. (In re Coastal Cable T.V., Inc.), 709 F.2d 762, 764 (1st Cir.
1983) (noting that a debtor need not necessarily be insolvent). But see Lynch v. Johns-Mansville Sales Corp.,
23 B.R. 750, 752 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
73 See Susan Block-Lieb, Fishing in Muddy Waters: Clarifying the Common Pool Analogy as Applied to
the Standard for Commencement of a Bankruptcy Case, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 337, 418–27 (1993); Ali M.M.
Mojdehi & Janet Dean Gertz, The Implicit “Good Faith” Requirement in Chapter 11 Liquidations: A Rule in
Search of a Rationale?, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 143, 145–46 (2006).
74 See Carlos J. Cuevas, Good Faith and Chapter 11: Standard that Should Be Employed To Dismiss Bad
Faith Chapter 11 Cases, 60 TENN. L. REV. 525, 581–82 & n.340 (1993); Mojdehi & Gertz, supra note 73, at
158; Thomas E. Plank, The Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, 63 TENN. L. REV. 487, 488 (1996); Lawrence
Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Implied Good Faith Filing Requirement: Sentinel of an Evolving
Bankruptcy Policy, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 919, 921 n.7 (1991) (“Conspicuous by its absence from the Bankruptcy
Code is any requirement that the debtor be insolvent in either an equity or balance sheet sense.”); Alan N.
Resnick, Bankruptcy as a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening Mass Tort Liability, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 2045, 2055 (2000); Howard Seife, Solvent Debtors May Be Unable To Enter Bankruptcy in Absence of
“Financial Distress,” 122 BANKING L.J. 52, 52 (2005) (arguing also that this trend may be reversing); Keach,
supra note 14, at 36 (suggesting that the trend of open access to the bankruptcy system may be reversing).
75 Resnick, supra note 74, at 2055.
76 See ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS:
TEXTS, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 422 (6th ed. 2009).
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to firms outside of bankruptcy, like the ability to void or assign executory
contracts.77
A firm’s access to the bankruptcy system depends, not as much on its
solvency, as on whether it filed a petition in good faith.78 The essential
requirement for a showing of good faith is that the petition has some “valid
reorganizational purpose.”79 This means that the business must enter chapter
11 for one of the purposes that the chapter was intended to serve,80 and not
some other reason, such as gaining a tactical advantage in litigation.81
One case on this issue is In re SGL Carbon Corp.82 In that case, a
corporation filed for chapter 11, claiming that an impending antitrust suit
threatened to make the corporation insolvent.83 Simultaneously, the CEO of the
corporation had a conference call with securities analysts in which he stated
that SGL Carbon was experiencing healthy and growing success and
denied that the class action antitrust litigation was materially
interfering with SGL Carbon’s operations or its customer
relationships. [The CEO] added that unlike most [c]hapter 11 cases,
SGL Carbon’s petition did not involve serious insolvency or credit
problems. SGL Carbon Vice President Theodore Breyer
acknowledged in his deposition that SGL Carbon had no defaults nor
any financial distress when it filed for [c]hapter 11.84

Thus, the petition was dismissed for a lack of good faith.85 Even the court
in In re SGL Carbon noted that that case is the exception to the general rule
that the Code is intended to encourage early filing.86

77

Plank, supra note 74, at 548–51.
See Keach, supra note 14, at 36.
79 See In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 1999); Keach, supra note 14, at 36 (quoting
SGL Carbon, 200 F.3d at 165) (internal quotation marks omitted).
80 See SGL Carbon, 200 F.3d at 165 (citing Marsch v. Marsch (In re Marsch), 36 F.3d 825, 828 (9th Cir.
1994)).
81 Id. at 165 (citing Furness v. Lilienfield, 35 B.R. 1006, 1013 (Bankr. D. Md. 1983)).
82 Id. at 154.
83 See id. at 157.
84 Id. at 166 (internal quotation marks omitted)
85 Id. at 156.
86 See id. at 163 (“It is well established that a debtor need not be insolvent before filing for bankruptcy
protection. It also is clear that the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code understood the need for early access to
bankruptcy relief to allow a debtor to rehabilitate its business before it is faced with a hopeless situation.”
(citations omitted)).
78
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PART II
Three doctrines have been discussed so far. Substantive consolidation
allows bankruptcy courts to pull a debtor’s related entities into bankruptcy to
ensure a more equitable distribution to creditors.87 There is also a general trend
in bankruptcy that courts will not enforce either a promise not to file for
bankruptcy or a waiver of specific rights in bankruptcy by an individual or a
business.88 Finally, courts recognize a policy of encouraging businesses to file
early because of the concern that, if they wait too long to enter bankruptcy,
they will be so hopelessly insolvent that there will not be a realistic chance for
them to reorganize or even to pay a meaningful amount to creditors.89 Courts
will not make an in-depth inquiry into a business’s reasons for entering
bankruptcy unless it is clear that the filing is really just an attempt to defraud
creditors.90 Thus, there will be cases where solvent debtors file bankruptcy
merely to take advantage of some provision of the Code.
The next step is to look at a case in which these three doctrines overlap
with each other to produce questionable results. In In re General Growth,
several subsidiaries of a Real Estate Investment Trust were effectively
substantively consolidated with the bankruptcy of their parent corporation.91
The subsidiaries promised not to file for bankruptcy, and they had attempted to
organize themselves as bankruptcy-proof SPEs.92 Moreover, many of these
87

See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
89 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
90 See, e.g., SGL Carbon, 200 F.3d at 166.
91 Note that the court in In re Gen. Growth denied that it was substantively consolidating the SPEs with
General Growth. In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43, 69 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). This is true as a
technical point because the SPEs still had individual bankruptcy cases. Id. at 54. However, several
commentators have noted that what the court did was close to substantive consolidation or at least signaled a
move toward substantive consolidation in similar cases in the future. James Bryce Clark & Maura B.
O’Connor, Judicial Responses to SPE Structures: Less than Meets the Eye, But More to Come, in 1
COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE FINANCING 2010: HOW TO HANDLE DEFAULTS, DISTRESS, MATURITIES, AND
STACKS OF DEBT 197, 207 (Peter S. Muñoz, Peter A. Sarasek & Joshua Stein eds., 2010); Jason Lynch,
Reevaluating Bankruptcy Remoteness: Transfers of Risk, Implications of the GGP Reorganization, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., July/Aug. 2010, at 58, 58; George R. Pitts, More than Was Dreamt of in Your Philosophy:
Recent Developments and Familiar Principles in Chapter 11 Cases, in CREDITORS’ RIGHTS IN CHAPTER 11
CASES: LEADING LAWYERS ON IDENTIFYING AND PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF SECURED AND UNSECURED
CREDITORS DURING CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY CASES 23, 31 (2010); see also supra discussion accompanying
notes 28–31.
92 Gen. Growth, 409 B.R. at 61; see also Lynch, supra note 91, at 60; McInerney, supra note 8, at 9;
Stratton, supra note 42, at 36; General Growth: Bankruptcy and the Downfall of Securitization as We Know
It?, WESTLAW LEGAL CURRENTS (May 5, 2009), http://www3.gsionline.com/Legalcurrents/Article_20090505_
E1.asp (last visited Jan. 19, 2012).
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subsidiaries were not in financial distress; they had not defaulted on payment
of their loans, and they had complied with all the provisions of their lending
documents.93 Despite these circumstances, the SPEs were allowed to file along
with their parent corporation.94 This Comment will attempt to demonstrate
that, in cases like In re General Growth, there is reason to give effect to an
attempt by a debtor and its creditor to contract around the bankruptcy system.
First, it is necessary to fully understand the transaction at issue in In re General
Growth.
A. The Special Purpose Entity
A special purpose entity, or SPE, is an entity (a corporation in the instance
of General Growth) that is organized so that a lender can “reduce the risk that
the borrower will file bankruptcy.”95 An SPE can also take the form of a
limited partnership or a limited liability company.96 It is also sometimes called
a single purpose entity97 or a special purpose vehicle.98 The general idea is that,
instead of lending to a large company that already has obligations to other
creditors, a lender can extend credit to a subsidiary of that company that has
been organized only to manage the specific project for which the loan is
required.99 The subsidiary is less likely to file for bankruptcy because it is
insulated from the financial obligations of the parent corporation and only
manages one piece of property, and even if the subsidiary does file for
bankruptcy, the lender is still at a reduced risk because it will not have to
compete with every creditor of the parent for the subsidiary’s assets.100
B. Structure of SPEs
The first step in creating an SPE is for the parent company to transfer assets
to the SPE.101 For example, if the SPE is to own and manage a piece of real
estate and needs a loan to acquire or improve that real estate, then the parent
company transfers to the SPE the property to be used as collateral for the

93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101

Prudential Insurance Company’s Objection, supra note 11, at 3.
Gen. Growth, 409 B.R. at 46–47.
MICHAEL T. MADISON ET AL., THE LAW OF REAL ESTATE FINANCING § 13:38, at 13-70 (2009).
See Stratton, supra note 42, at 36.
Id.
Lynch, supra note 91, at 58.
See, e.g., Stratton, supra note 42, at 36.
Id.
Id.; see McInerney, supra note 8, at 9.
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loan.102 Then, when the SPE is ready to borrow, the lender insists on certain
provisions in the loan documentation that assure the bankruptcy-remote status
of the SPE. The two types of provisions put in the loan documents are: (1)
covenants designed to ensure that the borrower continues to operate as a single
purpose entity; and (2) the appointment of an independent director to the SPE’s
board who takes the lender’s interest into account in any decision to file
bankruptcy.103
These covenants are designed to ensure that the actions of the SPE remain
independent from those of the parent company or its affiliates.104 The creditor
of the SPE is trying to avoid two things: First, it does not want the SPE to incur
any other debt or to guarantee the debt of any affiliate or otherwise-related
entity.105 Second, it does not want the SPE to engage in any other business
transaction because it does not want cash that should be used to develop the
subject property, or other collateral for the loan, to be diverted to some other
venture.106 Covenants often prohibit the borrower from:
(1) engaging in business other than to operate the collateral;
(2) owning property other than the collateral; (3) merging with
another entity or acquiring any subsidiary; (4) incurring other debt
(with exceptions of ordinary course trade payables and equipment
financing); (5) co-mingling assets with affiliates; and (6)
guaranteeing the debt of an affiliate or pledging its assets to secure
the debt of another. . . . [The covenants may also] (7) require with
regard to any affiliates that the borrower maintain separate books and
records, bank accounts, and maintain a separate office.107

These restrictions are often included in the organizational documents of the
SPE as well as the loan documentation.108 The covenants are designed to
ensure that the SPE does not find itself in a position where it would need to file
bankruptcy, i.e., it does not incur any debt besides the debt it owes to the one
lender.109
The appointment of the independent director is meant to ensure that the
SPE’s management does not make decisions without taking into account the
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

McInnerney, supra note 8; Stratton, supra note 42, at 36.
Stratton, supra note 42, at 36.
See McInerney, supra note 8, at 9; Stratton, supra note 42, at 36.
See MADISON ET AL., supra note 95, § 13:38, at 13-70 (2009); Stratton, supra note 42, at 36.
See Stratton, supra note 42, at 36.
MADISON ET AL., supra note 95, § 13:38, at 13-70 (2009) (footnote omitted).
Id.
See id.
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interests of the creditor.110 Because the parent company owns the SPE, the
individuals appointed to the management structure of the SPE often have some
relationship with the parent company.111 In some cases, an individual on the
parent company’s board of directors can also be on the SPE’s board of
directors.112 In that case, the lender is concerned that, if the parent company is
in financial distress, the interests of the SPE will take a backseat to the interests
of the parent, and the SPE’s management will choose to voluntarily file for
bankruptcy or to make some other business decision that may be detrimental to
the creditor.113
To alleviate this concern, the lender insists on the appointment of an
independent director to the SPE’s management that has no relationship to the
parent.114 The SPE is required to obtain the consent115 of the independent
director to: (1) file for bankruptcy; or (2) make any amendment to the SPE’s
organizational documents.116 The independent director is also required to take
into account the interests of the creditor when voting on any action by the
SPE.117
One question concerning independent directors that arises with some
frequency is to whom do these directors owe a fiduciary duty?118 In In re
General Growth, the SPEs have included provisions in their loan
documentation that prompted the independent directors to consider only the
interests of the secured creditors when voting as a board member.119 However,
the court held that the independent directors were constrained by their original
operating agreements, which required board members to consider the interests
of the parent companies—including perhaps the parent’s creditors—when
making a decision about the corporation’s business operations.120 Independent

110

See Stratton, supra note 42, at 36.
See id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 In practice, the independent director does not officially have veto power over a decision to file, but
there are circumstances where the independent manager is, in effect, given veto power when the unanimous
consent of the board is required. See, e.g., In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43, 63 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2009).
116 Stratton, supra note 42, at 36.
117 Id.
118 See, e.g., Gen. Growth, 409 B.R. at 63; In re Kingston Square Assocs., 214 B.R. 713, 721 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1997).
119 See Gen. Growth, 409 B.R. at 64.
120 See id. at 63.
111
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directors are also constrained by their obligation to consider the interests of
investors when making decisions about whether to file bankruptcy.121
Independent directors can thus be put in a position where they have seemingly
conflicting fiduciary duties: one to the creditors of the SPE, and a second to the
shareholders of the corporation on whose board they sit.122 In the case of
corporations, courts will look to the law of the state of incorporation to
determine questions of who has the authority to file a voluntary bankruptcy
petition.123
C. Benefits of SPEs
Some benefits of the SPE structure to the lender are straightforward: if the
SPE follows the covenants described above, the lender is less exposed to the
risk that the borrower would incur other financial obligations and have the
lender’s collateral end up in the bankruptcy estate of the parent company.
Because of the reduced risk, the lender can offer credit on more favorable
terms, and so for the borrower, the SPE structure offers an opportunity to
borrow at a lower interest rate than might be available for the parent
company.124 The credit rating of an SPE is generally higher than its parent
because the SPE holds only one isolated asset and does not have any debt,
whereas the parent may already have various obligations to different lenders.125
Thus, it is easier for the SPE to attract investors and borrow at lower rates than
the parent.126
Another advantage to an SPE transaction from the lender’s perspective
comes from § 362(d)(3),127 which authorizes lifting the automatic stay in single
asset real estate (SARE) chapter 11 cases.128 Under § 362(d)(3), a court must
grant relief from the stay “with respect to a stay of an act against single asset
real estate under subsection (a), by a creditor whose claim is secured by an
interest in such real estate . . . .”129 Section 101 defines “single asset real
estate” as follows:

121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129

See id. at 64–65; Stratton, supra note 42, at 36.
See Stratton, supra note 42, at 36.
Id. at 37; see, e.g., Gen. Growth, 409 B.R. at 63–64.
Stratton, supra note 42, at 36.
See id.
See id.
11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3) (2006).
See id.
Id.
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The term “single asset real estate” means real property constituting a
single property or project, other than residential real property with
fewer than 4 residential units, which generates substantially all of the
gross income of a debtor who is not a family farmer and on which no
substantial business is being conducted by a debtor other than the
business of operating the real property and activities incidental
130
thereto.

In theory, § 362 would apply to SPEs that exist solely to manage or own a
single piece of real estate.131
D. Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities
Perhaps the most attractive aspect of the SPE in the real estate context is
that the loan an SPE obtains can be pooled together with other loans and sold
as commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS).132 In a CMBS transaction,
a lender makes several mortgage loans to separate entities.133 It then pools
those mortgages together and sells them to a securitization trust.134 The trust
then sells securities to investors.135 These securities constitute the right to
payment on the original mortgages.136
Every month the interest payments made on a pool of loans are paid to
investors in order based on the rating of the bonds they hold.137 Each class of
investor must be paid completely before any lower class gets paid, and thus the
highest bondholders have a minimal risk of not receiving payment.138 Indeed,
before the recent financial crisis, some higher-rated mortgage-backed securities
were given the same credit rating as U.S. Treasury bonds.139 From the
originating lender’s perspective, the CMBS transaction is desirable because it
can sell a mortgage off to be securitized and receive money from investors

130

Id. § 101(51B).
See Prudential Insurance Company’s Objection, supra note 11, at 26.
132 Dolan, supra note 6, at 597–98; Bankruptcy and the Downfall of Securitization, supra note 92.
133 Dolan, supra note 6, at 597–98.
134 Id. at 598.
135 Id.; Anna T. Pinedo, Easing into a New Model for Housing Finance: A Postmortem on Securitization
and the Financial Crisis, 41 UCC L.J. 157, 162 (2009).
136 Pinedo, supra note 135, at 162.
137 COMMERCIAL MORTG. SEC. ASS’N & MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, BORROWER GUIDE TO CMBS 2 (2004),
available at http://www.crefc.org/industryresources.aspx?id=3348
138 Id.
139 Randolph C. Thompson, Mortgage Backed Securities, Wall Street, and the Making of a Global
Financial Crisis, BUS. L. BRIER, Fall 2008, at 51, 52.
131
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right away instead of waiting for payment from each individual mortgagor.140
Thus, the lender can offer better terms to each borrower.
Moreover, CMBS bring a new source of capital to the commercial real
estate market because investors who purchase securities would “otherwise not
be active real estate lenders.”141 In 2007 alone, the amount of credit created for
property owners because of the CMBS structure was valued at approximately
$230 billion.142
The SPE is crucial to the success of a CMBS transaction. Some
commentators have suggested that if bankruptcy-remote SPEs did not exist, the
entire CMBS market would collapse.143 For rating purposes, CMBS are made
up of mortgages that have similar terms.144 Rating agencies base the rating of
security on how likely it is that the pool of borrowers will pay off the debt.
Thus, the original lender in a CMBS transaction must be certain that the
borrower will not end up in financial distress, and more specifically, that the
asset being financed will not become subject to other debt.145 This is because
the value of securities is directly tied to the credit rating they receive, which in
turn is directly tied to the likelihood that the original mortgagers will default.
The income generated by CMBS is made up of payments made by the original
mortgagors. If those mortgagors end up in bankruptcy, or if their property
becomes encumbered by other debt, then they are much more likely to default
on payments.
E. The General Growth Properties Bankruptcy
In 2009, General Growth filed a voluntary petition under chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code.146 General Growth’s bankruptcy is interesting because it
calls into question the effectiveness of the bankruptcy-remote SPE.147 Aside
140

Pinedo, supra note 135, at 162.
Amended Brief of Amici Curiae with Respect to the Filing of Voluntary Petitions in Bankruptcy by the
Individual Property Owner Subsidiaries in the General Growth Properties, Inc. Bankruptcy at 5, In re Gen.
Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09-11977 (ALG)) [hereinafter Amended Amici
Brief].
142 Id.
143 Bankruptcy and the Downfall of Securitization, supra note 92.
144 Pinedo, supra note 135, at 163.
145 Amended Amici Brief, supra note 141 at 6–7, 11.
146 In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43, 54 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
147 See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 91, at 58; McInerney, supra note 8, at 9; Arthur J. Steinberg & Scott I.
Davidson, Bankruptcy Remote Entities: Not as Remote as You May Think, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 18, 2009, at 4,
141
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from its effect on the commercial real estate finance market, this bankruptcy
also highlights a potential problem—that the Code does not allow businesses to
contract away their right to file for bankruptcy.
General Growth was the parent corporation of hundreds of SPEs.148 When
General Growth filed for bankruptcy, it brought those entities into its
bankruptcy estate, surprising creditors who had made loans to those entities on
the assumption that they would remain bankruptcy-remote.149 Even more
troubling to these creditors was the fact that many of the SPEs were allowed to
enter bankruptcy, despite the fact that they had positive cash flows and no
imminent risk of mortgage default.150 This Comment addresses why businesses
like the SPEs in General Growth are allowed to file for bankruptcy.
General Growth was organized as a Real Estate Investment Trust
(REIT).151 A REIT is “a tax-favored vehicle through which the average
person” can invest in real estate.152 The purpose of the REIT is to allow
individuals who otherwise would not have the financial means to invest in real
estate to do so through a trust.153 Investors receive shares in the trust, which
holds real estate and is managed by professionals.154 The income to the REIT
is not subject to the federal income tax.155 To qualify as an REIT, an entity
must meet the following eight requirements:
(1) be organized as a corporation, trust, or association;
(2) be managed by one or more trustee or directors;
(3) have transferable shares or certificates;
(4) be taxable as a domestic corporation . . . ;
(5) not be a financial institution or insurance company;
(6) be owned by 100 or more persons;
(7) not be closely held; and

available at http://www.kslaw.com/imageserver/KSPublic/Library/publication/11-09%20NYLJ%20Steinberg,
%20Davidson.pdf.
148 Gen. Growth, 409 B.R. at 48.
149 Kris Hudson & Lingling Wei, Move by General Growth Rattles Malls’ Investors, WALL ST. J., May 8,
2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124163910180492861.html.
150 Steinberg & Davidson, supra note 147, at 4.
151 Gen. Growth, 409 B.R. at 47.
152 Michael K. Carnevale et al., Real Estate Investment Trusts, 742-3d Tax Mgmt. (BNA), U.S. Income, at
Introduction (2008).
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
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(8) elect to be taxed as a REIT or have in effect such an election
156
made for a previous taxable year.

General Growth owned or operated over 200 shopping centers in 44 different
states.157 It owned and managed these properties indirectly through hundreds of
small subsidiaries, many of which were organized as SPEs.158
General Growth financed its operations three ways. Some of the properties
were funded by conventional mortgage debt.159 Other properties were funded
by commercial mortgages that were bundled and sold into the CMBS
market.160 And some of the properties were funded by “mezzanine loans.”161
Mezzanine loans are a form of financing available to owners of property
that has already been mortgaged.162 The key to mezzanine financing is a
process called “structural subordination.”163 In a mezzanine loan transaction,
the property owner forms a new entity to which it transfers all of the property’s
equity.164 The owner pledges the ownership of the new entity to the lender as
security for the loan. Thus, the lender has no claim against either the holder of
the first mortgage on the property or against the property itself.165 The benefit
of mezzanine financing is that it allows a borrower to receive more financing
on an individual piece of property without having to take a second mortgage,
which poses increased risks for the lenders in the first mortgage.166
Much of General Growth’s debt was financed in the CMBS market.167 General
Growth formed SPEs to own or manage shopping centers, and each SPE
mortgaged the subject property. These mortgages matured after only seven
years and had balloon payments due at maturity. When the CMBS market was
healthy, General Growth would refinance mortgages that were

156

Id.
In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43, 47 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
158 Id. at 49.
159 Id.
160 The court found that as time went on this became the primary source of capital for General Growth. Id.
at 50; Bankruptcy and the Downfall of Securitization, supra note 92.
161 Gen. Growth, 409 B.R. at 51.
162 Steve Horowitz & Lisa Morrow, Mezzanine Financing, in REAL ESTATE FINANCING DOCUMENTATION
649, 651–52 (ALI-ABA Continuing Legal Education, Course of Study No. SL007, 2006).
163 Id. at 652.
164 See Andrew R. Berman, Risks and Realities of Mezzanine Loans, 72 MO. L. REV. 993, 995 (2007).
165 Id. at 1015.
166 Horowitz & Morrow, supra note 162, at 652.
167 Bankruptcy and the Downfall of Securitization, supra note 92.
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close to maturing.168 Unfortunately for General Growth, the CMBS market
collapsed during the financial crisis of 2008.169 Thus, General Growth was
unable to refinance its mortgage debt and was at risk of going into default on
billions of dollars of debt that would come due within a few years. General
Growth filed for bankruptcy when it determined that it would not be able to
refinance this debt.170
Though General Growth as a whole was struggling, many of its SPEs were
in perfect financial health.171 Nevertheless, General Growth caused its SPEs to
file for bankruptcy, and the bankruptcies of General Growth and its SPEs were
administratively consolidated into a single proceeding.172
There are two primary reasons that the SPEs were compelled to join
General Growth in bankruptcy. First, the court rejected the creditors’ argument
that the SPEs’ petitions should be dismissed as premature, bad-faith filings.173
The court deferred to General Growth’s finding that its capital structure had
become unmanageable and any financially healthy SPEs would not be so once
their mortgages matured. This approach is consistent with the Code’s early
filing allowance.174 In this case, General Growth hired financial analysts to
evaluate each SPE debtor. It then held a series of meetings with financial
analysts and restructuring advisors in which the Vice Chairman of General
Growth “provided an overview of [each subject debtor’s] financial and
operational considerations, including the property’s performance, outlook, and
projected capital needs.”175 The board then separated the SPEs into different
classes based on these factors and voted on whether to put each debtor into
bankruptcy. The court noted that, although some of the debtors were
financially healthy, many others had mortgage debt that was hyperamortizing
or maturing before 2012, and some were guarantors on maturing loans taken

168

In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43, 53 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the
Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 1038 (2009).
170 Gen. Growth, 409 B.R. at 55.
171 Steinberg & Davidson, supra note 147, at 4.
172 Brian M. Resnick & Steven C. Krause, Not So Bankruptcy-Remote SPEs and In re General Growth
Properties Inc., AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2009, at 1, 1.
173 Gen. Growth, 409 B.R. at 56.
174 See, e.g., In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 1999) (“The District Court was correct
in noting that the Bankruptcy Code encourages early filing. It is well established that a debtor need not be
insolvent before filing for bankruptcy protection.” (citation omitted)); see also Resnick, supra note 74, at 2055.
175 Gen. Growth, 409 B.R. at 58 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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out by other entities, which would be a clear violation of the covenants made to
make the SPEs bankruptcy-remote.176
In denying the motions to dismiss, the court applied a form of de facto
substantive consolidation, despite the court’s insistence that the SPE structure
was safe and that it would not apply substantive consolidation to the facts in
this case.177 The court deemed this a fair result because the SPEs’ lenders, the
movants in this case, did not deny that they knew that they were lending to a
larger corporate structure.178 Moreover, the court found that some of the SPEs
were commingling assets and making intercompany loans.179
F. An Example of the Transaction at Issue in General Growth: The
Harborplace Loan
The Harborplace loan is representative of how transactions between lenders
and SPEs were structured under General Growth and will give the reader a
concrete idea of what those transactions looked like. On September 11, 2007,
Prudential Insurance delivered a note for $50 million (Note) to an SPE of
General Growth to secure real property in Baltimore known as Harborplace.180
Section 14 of the Note stated:
Borrower hereby covenants . . . during the term of the Loan,
Borrower shall not (i) engage in any business other than entering into
and performing its obligations under the Documents; (ii) acquire or
own a material asset; (iii) maintain assets in a way difficult to
segregate and identify, or commingle its assets with the assets of any
other person or entity; (iv) fail to hold itself out to the public as a
legal entity separate from any other or fail to maintain capital
sufficient therefore; (v) fail to conduct business in its own name or
fail to maintain record, accounts or bank accounts separate from any
other person or entity; (vi) file or consent to a petition pursuant to
applicable bankruptcy, insolvency, liquidation or reorganization
statues[sic], or make an assignment for the benefit of creditors
with[out] the unanimous consent of its members; (vii) incur
additional indebtedness except for trade payables in the ordinary
course of business, provided that such indebtedness is paid sixty (60)
days after incurred; (viii) dissolve, liquidate, consolidate, merge or

176
177
178
179
180

Id.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 61.
Resnick & Krause, supra note 172, at 60.
Prudential Insurance Company’s Objection, supra note 11, at 6.
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sell all or substantially all of its assets; or (ix) modify, amend or
revise its organization documents in any material respect which
adversely affects its existence as a single purpose entity or its
181
performance of obligations with respect to the Loan.

Section 2.10 of the Note contained the following warranties: “(i) Grantor’s
only asset is the Property and (ii) the Property generates substantially all of the
gross income of the Grantor and (iii) there is no substantial business being
conducted by the Grantor other than the business of operating the Property and
the activities incidental thereto.”182 The Note also contained these covenants:
Grantor hereby covenants and agrees that (i) during the term of the
Loan, Grantor shall not own any assets in addition to the Property,
(ii) the Property shall remain as a single property or project, and (iii)
during the term of the Loan, the Property shall generate substantially
all of the gross income of the grantor and there is no substantial
business being conducted by the Grantor other than the business of
operating the Property and the activities incidental thereto.183

The Harborplace borrower was not in default on the loan.184 However, over
Prudential’s objection, the court entered an order on May 14, 2009, authorizing
other debtors’ use of Prudential’s cash collateral in the Harborplace loan.185
Thus, when the court speaks of the “varying financial distress” of individual
debtors that justified General Growth placing those debtors into bankruptcy, it
is including at least some SPEs that were in fact not in financial distress at
all.186
PART III
There has been an academic debate for some time over the mandatory
nature of chapter 11 proceedings.187 In Robert Rasmussen’s 1992 article,
Debtor’s Choice: A Menu Approach to Bankruptcy, he argued that there was
“increasing uneasiness . . . over the normative desirability” of the chapter 11
process in the academic community.188 The debate, however, was solely
181

Id. at 8.
Id.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 5.
185 In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 412 B.R. 122, 134 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
186 In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43, 57 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
187 Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV.
51, 52–53, 60–61 (1993).
188 Id. at 52.
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focused on whether Congress or the courts could fashion a better remedy.189
Rasmussen suggested that a firm’s investors control the firm’s access to
bankruptcy reorganization instead of allowing legislators to address the
issue.190
This article instigated a debate between contractualists, 191who argued that
businesses should be given more control over what happens in the case of
insolvency, and traditionalists,192 who argued that the bankruptcy system
attempts to address certain concerns for which privatized insolvency
proceedings would fail to adequately account.193 Many different perspectives
have been offered as part of the debate, but the two sides essentially break
down in the following way.
Contractualists argued that the Bankruptcy Code is an inefficient model for
some firms and that those firms should be able to alter their rights in
bankruptcy and find a model that works for them.194 Traditionalists essentially
responded that parties contracting around bankruptcy do not have the
appropriate incentives to internalize all the effects of a debtor’s insolvency and
that the legislature better takes into account the interests of some third party.195
The rest of this Comment will argue that the SPE structure at issue in In re
General Growth is an example of a case where bankruptcy courts should reevaluate their refusal to enforce a waiver of the right to file bankruptcy. The
argument is that, at the lending stage, General Growth’s subsidiaries should
189

Id.
Id. at 53 (“[A] firm’s ability to file for bankruptcy reorganization should be determined by the firm’s
investors rather than by the government.”).
191 See Edward S. Adams & James L. Baillie, A Privatization Solution to the Legitimacy of Prepetition
Waivers of the Automatic Stay, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1996); David Gray Carlson, Bankruptcy Theory and the
Creditors’ Bargain, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 453, 457 (1992); Rafael Efrat, The Case for Limited Enforceability of a
Pre-Petition Waiver of the Automatic Stay, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1133 (1995); Kelch & Slattery, supra note
56; Rasmussen, supra note 187, at 53; Schwarcz, supra note 57, at 532; Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy
Contracting Reviewed, 109 YALE L.J. 343 (1999); Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business
Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807 (1998) [hereinafter Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach]; Tracht, supra
note 58, at 307.
192 See, e.g., Susan Block-Lieb, The Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 503,
505 (2001); Lynn M. LoPucki, Contract Bankruptcy: A Reply to Alan Schwartz, 109 YALE L.J. 317 (1999)
[hereinafter LoPucki, Contract Bankruptcy]; Lynn M. LoPucki, Bankruptcy Contracting Revised: A Reply to
Alan Schwartz’s New Model, 109 YALE L.J. 365 (1999); Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook,
Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (2005).
193 Block-Lieb, supra note 192, at 505.
194 Ziad Raymond Azar, Bankruptcy Policy, Legal Heritage, and Financial Development: An Agenda for
Further Research, 24 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 379, 383 (2008).
195 Id. at 386.
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have been able to explicitly promise not to enter bankruptcy in addition to
“bankruptcy-proofing” themselves through the use of independent manager
provisions and separateness covenants. Such promises should be enforced in
cases where, like in In re General Growth, those subsidiaries are not insolvent.
This Comment contends that scholarship on contractual waivers of
bankruptcy has not adequately addressed the SPE issue and that the decision in
In re General Growth. reflects this shortcoming.196 The bankruptcy-remote
SPEs at issue in In re General Growth197 provide an example of a case where
bankruptcy courts should reevaluate their unwillingness to enforce waivers of
the right to file bankruptcy. If an entity has promised not to file, is not
insolvent, and has only one creditor, there is no reason to allow it access to the
bankruptcy system. In any bankruptcy case, there must be some origin of the
right to file; no one would argue that bankruptcy should be a system
completely open to any firm or individual regardless of financial condition. In
the case of SPEs, the normal arguments as to why firms should be allowed to
file early and should not be able to contract around bankruptcy do not seem to
carry as much weight. The SPE is unique from normal firms in several
respects. Most importantly, it has only one major creditor.198 And it is
organized for a narrow and more defined purpose and can only make
transactions that are specifically related to that purpose.199
The articles discussing contractual waivers of bankruptcy all deal with the
same basic fact pattern: a lender and a borrower want to enter a financing
arrangement, but they want to somehow alter their bankruptcy rights because
they believe that entering chapter 11 will be detrimental to their interests. The
borrower then becomes insolvent. The disagreement is over whether courts
should enforce the system that the parties negotiated for themselves or allow
either the debtor or creditor to enforce its bankruptcy rights, i.e., enforce a
voluntary filing by the debtor or an involuntary filing by a group of creditors.
An important premise on which the conclusion in this Comment is based is that
most, if not all, of the scholarship on the issue of contracting around
bankruptcy focuses solely on the situation where a firm contracts for a certain
bankruptcy and ends up insolvent, and not the situation in In re General

196

In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43, 47 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
Gen. Growth., 409 B.R. 43.
198 Stratton, supra note 42, at 36 (“One of the limitations included is restrictions on the ability of an SPE
to incur additional indebtedness, other than the indebtedness associated with the current transaction.”).
199 Id.
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Growth, where a firm contracts around bankruptcy, is not insolvent, but files
for bankruptcy regardless.200
In re General Growth adds a new wrinkle to the discussion because many
of the debtors in that case were solvent.201 The court justified allowing those
debtors to enter chapter 11 because, generally, courts will defer to a debtor’s
determination of whether it is in imminent financial distress; they do not want
to force debtors to wait until they are hopelessly insolvent to file. However, it
is not clear that the two theories—one that says businesses cannot waive their
rights to enter bankruptcy, one that says businesses should be allowed to file
early—can operate concurrently.
The rest of this section will discuss two arguments that are commonly
advanced against allowing firms to contract around bankruptcy—the creditors’
bargain theory and the interests of third parties in a large business
bankruptcy—and argues that they should not apply in the case of SPEs.
A. The Creditors’ Bargain Theory
The creditors’ bargain theory is often put forth as a reason that courts
should not enforce a debtor’s attempt to waive or otherwise alter its ability to

200

Adams & Baillie, supra note 191, at 2 (“The factual scenario described above is not an uncommon
one. When a corporate debtor defaults on an obligation to a lender, the two parties will often attempt to
renegotiate the loan agreement to give the debtor a chance to cure the default.”); Block-Lieb, supra note 192,
at 509 (“[P]art IV compares the implementation of three types of bankruptcy rules that could define rights in
the event of a debtor’s financial distress.”); LoPucki, Contract Bankruptcy, supra note 192, at 336 (discussing
bankruptcy-proofing structures: “[w]hen employed successfully, the result is usually that the debtor remains
outside bankruptcy; no court has occasion to write an opinion; and the existence of the contract remains known
only to the parties. Only the ‘clumsiest’ and ‘most egregious’ are challenged in court and risk exposure in
published opinions.”); Rasmussen, supra note 187, at 57 (“A creditor’s treatment in a bankruptcy proceeding
thus affects the creditor’s initial lending decision. This is because the bankruptcy regime specifies a creditor’s
payoff when certain contingencies occur. The contingencies that determine the creditor’s ‘bankruptcy payoff’
are the firm encountering financial distress and filing a bankruptcy petition.”); Schwartz, A Contract Theory
Approach, supra note 191, at 1807 (“Business bankruptcy systems attempt to solve a coordination problem for
the creditors of insolvent firms.”); Tracht, supra note 58, at 302 (“During the past decade, bankruptcy theory
has been dominated by a debate between proponents of economic models that emphasize bankruptcy as a
wealth-maximizing solution to the collective action problem facing creditors of insolvent firms, and critics
who see broader social goals for the bankruptcy system.”); Warren & Westbrook, supra note 192, at 1202
(“With our data, we explore these issues. We draw on information we have collected from thousands of failed
businesses that initially filed for bankruptcy . . . .”).
201 Bankruptcy and the Downfall of Securitization, supra note 92; see Robert A. Brown, Financial Reform
and the Subsidization of Sophisticated Investors’ Ignorance in Securitization Markets, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS.
105, 107 n.3, 132 (2010).
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file for bankruptcy.202 The theory begins with the premise that the bankruptcy
system was organized as a response to a collective action problem. Before the
Bankruptcy Act, state collection laws emphasized a “first in time” approach.203
Under this approach, when a debtor becomes insolvent, creditors essentially
race to the courthouse to collect on the debtor’s estate. The first creditor who is
able to perfect its interest and begin seizing the debtor’s assets is entitled to do
so.
The collective action problem arises because the acts of each individual
creditor in asserting its interest are detrimental to the creditors as a whole if
those acts decrease the value of the debtor’s estate.204 There are two ways in
which individual creditor actions can hurt creditors as a whole. First, creditors
may face high transactional costs in perfecting their interests in the debtor’s
assets.205 Second, the debtor’s assets may not be managed efficiently. For
example, if a debtor is forced to stop doing business and pay debts
immediately, then the value to creditors that could have been produced by
keeping the debtor afloat is lost.206 The result is that the creditors as a group
are worse off than they would have been if they had cooperated to maximize
the value of the debtor’s assets.207 Thus, the first in time approach to
bankruptcy is undesirable from both the creditor’s perspective, because any
one creditor faces higher costs and is less likely to reclaim its debt, and the
debtor’s perspective, because the system incentivizes behavior by creditors that
quickly depletes the debtor’s estate.208
Under the creditors’ bargain theory, the bankruptcy system can be
described as a hypothetical contract into which each creditor has entered to
avoid the collective action problem described above.209 Although the creditors
have not in fact entered into an agreement with each other, a system binding
the creditors can be justified theoretically on the basis that each creditor would
have agreed to it if the creditor were designing a bankruptcy system without

202 See Carlson, supra note 191, at 457; Rasmussen, supra note 187, at 53; Schwarcz, supra note 57, at
532; Tracht, supra note 58, at 307.
203 Schwarcz, supra note 57, at 527.
204 Alan Schwartz, Contracting About Bankruptcy, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 127, 128 (1997).
205 Tracht, supra note 58, at 315–16.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 316.
208 See id.
209 Lynn M. LoPucki, A Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization, 57 VAND. L. REV. 741,
744–45 (2004).
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any knowledge of what its position would be in relation to other creditors.210 If
the bankruptcy system can be viewed as a hypothetical contract to which each
creditor would agree, then system should maximize the wealth of the creditors
as a group because otherwise there would be no justification for binding each
creditor to the hypothetical contract. To do this, the system must achieve two
fundamental goals. First, it must place each creditor in as equal a position as
possible relative to other creditors.211 If the system does not treat creditors
equally, then it does not solve the collective action problem because the
preferred creditors still have an incentive to act to the detriment of other
creditors. Second, the system must put an emphasis on preserving value in the
debtor’s estate.212
The creditors’ bargain theory rejects contractual waivers of bankruptcy
rights on the grounds that such waivers allow one creditor to waive other
creditors’ rights under the hypothetical bankruptcy contract.213 Some
proponents of this theory argue that the issue is not whether waiving out of
bankruptcy is right or wrong but rather that it is impossible because bankruptcy
itself represents a contract that already binds creditors and debtors.214
Sometimes the problem is put in terms of “waiving the rights of others.”215
Under the creditors’ bargain theory, the debtor’s right to file bankruptcy is only
one of the rights at issue in a contractual waiver. In addition, each creditor has
a right to have the debtor file.216 Thus, if a debtor and a single creditor agree
that the debtor waives its right to file for bankruptcy, then they have in effect
waived the rights of other creditors. Presumably, this argument would not
apply to a case in which there is a single creditor and a single debtor, which is
exactly the case presented by General Growth’s SPEs.217
One major response to the creditors’ bargain theory starts by asking: “What
about the group of debtors and creditors for whom bankruptcy is not the most
efficient system?” Why shouldn’t a creditor and debtor be able to opt out of the

210

Carlson, supra note 191, at 458.
Id. at 462 (noting that there is an argument that the current bankruptcy system does not do this at all,
because it divides creditors into different classes and gives them different rights based on, to give an example,
whether they are secured or unsecured).
212 Id. at 464.
213 See Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725, 728 (1984).
214 LoPucki, Contract Bankruptcy, supra note 192, at 317–18.
215 Tracht, supra note 58, at 335.
216 See, e.g., In re Sky Grp. Int’l, Inc. 108 B.R. 86, 88 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) (“The legislative history
makes it clear that the automatic stay has a dual purpose of protecting the debtor and all creditors alike . . . .”).
217 See In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43, 49 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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bankruptcy system if they determine that bankruptcy would not be the most
profit-maximizing way to respond to the debtor becoming insolvent? The
proponent of the creditors’ bargain theory would make the response above and
note that even if one creditor is willing to allow the debtor to opt out, that
creditor cannot waive the rights of other creditors. However, assuming a world
of rational and sophisticated bargainers, the creditors and debtors for whom
bankruptcy does not maximize profit will “sort” themselves out of the pool of
creditors and debtors that benefit from bankruptcy if the waiver option is
available to them.218 To see why, consider the following. Imagine that a
borrower, X, has determined that the legal and administrative costs of chapter
11 are too burdensome, and it would prefer to waive its right to file. If
bankruptcy is truly an efficient system for some lenders, then the cost of
borrowing from those lenders for X will be increased as they will increase the
cost of capital in exchange for allowing X to opt out of the bankruptcy
system.219 However, creditors expecting to do well if the borrower’s
bankruptcy rights were waived would lend to X on terms that are more
favorable.220 Thus, if lenders and borrowers can reasonably predict whether a
bankruptcy will be beneficial to their interests and can opt out of the
bankruptcy system if they so choose, then it is unlikely that a borrower will
simultaneously be in debt to one creditor that prefers the bankruptcy system
and one creditor that prefers some other remedy.221 If such a situation can be
avoided, then the creditors’ bargain theory loses much of its force.
This response assumes a high level of sophistication on the part of
borrowers and lenders. Both parties must be able to accurately predict whether
a bankruptcy would be beneficial or detrimental to them. One obstacle to this
position is evidence that managers put in the position to make such promises
tend to underestimate the likelihood and the negative consequences of
insolvency.222 However, there is empirical evidence that parties can accurately
predict whether opting out of bankruptcy would be beneficial.223
The creditors’ bargain theory questions the ability of a firm to contract
around the bankruptcy system because of the idea that the bankruptcy system
itself is a contract between all of the firm’s potential creditors and that any one
218
219
220
221
222
223

Tracht, supra note 58, at 317–18.
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See id. at 335.
See id. at 317–18.
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creditor should not have the ability to waive the other creditors’ rights to have
the debtor in bankruptcy.224 This argument holds significantly less weight in
the case of an SPE. This is because SPEs, by design, have only one major
creditor and are contractually restricted from acquiring any more.225 The
covenants that the borrower-SPE made to acquire the Harborplace Loan
described previously illustrate this point. That SPE promised not to “(i) engage
in any business other than entering into and performing its obligations under
the Documents; (ii) acquire or own a material asset; (iii) maintain assets in a
way difficult to segregate and identify, or commingle its assets with the assets
of any other person or entity.”226 The SPE also promised not to “incur
additional indebtedness except for trade payables in the ordinary course of
business, provided that such indebtedness is paid sixty (60) days after
incurred.”227 Assuming that the SPE does not violate these covenants, there is
no risk that it will incur any significant debt aside from that owed to the lender
and some short-term debt owed to vendors and suppliers for sixty-day periods
at a time. Thus, the bankruptcy system does not represent a creditors’ bargain
to find a remedy to the SPE’s financial distress because the SPE in fact has
only one creditor and that creditor has contracted for its own remedy.
Separateness covenants do not, however, address the issue of “involuntary
creditors,” such as tort claimants, unsophisticated creditors, and creditors
whose claims are so small as not to justify the costs that accompany a
transactional solution.228 There is a risk that, even having entered into an
agreement with the lender to only engage in a single and defined business
venture, the SPE will commit a tort against some third party that will result in a
large judgment against this SPE. A traditionalist would argue that giving effect
to the SPE’s promise not to file bankruptcy would subvert the rights of the
involuntary creditor, which did not have a chance to come to the table when
the SPE and the lender were negotiating.229 However, enforcing a promise not
to file only in the case that the SPE remains solvent would not affect the rights
of these creditors. Say that one involuntary creditor won a tort judgment
against an SPE. If the SPE were able to pay the judgment without becoming
insolvent, then it would be forced to do so since the alternative of filing for
chapter 11 would not be available. If the judgment were so large that the SPE
224
225
226
227
228
229
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did not have sufficient assets to pay it, then the SPE would have liabilities in
excess of its assets and thus be insolvent. The SPE could enter chapter 11,230
and the involuntary creditor would not be in the same position as if the promise
not to file had not been given any effect. Additionally, the original lender,
assuming that it is a sophisticated party, should be able to account for the risk
that the SPE will receive such a judgment against it since it can be sure that the
SPE has not contracted with any other third party in a way that affects its
bankruptcy rights.231
The creditors’ bargain theory should not be considered a reason not to
enforce waivers of bankruptcy privileges by SPEs because the theory does not
adequately describe the relationship between an SPE and its creditors. The
theory assumes that a debtor can have multiple creditors: voluntary or
involuntary, sophisticated or unsophisticated, with or without security interests.
However, because of the nature of the SPE, the number of creditors is
narrowed to one original lender and a class of possible involuntary creditors
whose rights would not be affected by allowing the SPE to contract around the
bankruptcy system.
B. The Interests of the Community
A second reason why courts may not want to enforce a contractual waiver
of the right to file for bankruptcy is the impact of a debtor’s insolvency on the
community.232 A bankruptcy, especially in the case of larger businesses, can
impact third parties, such as employees, customers, and suppliers.233 There is
debate on the extent to which the Bankruptcy Code itself adequately protects
the interests of these third parties.234 A creditor and debtor who fashion their
own remedy for the insolvency of the debtor are unlikely to give much, if any,
weight to the interests of third parties, potentially forcing those parties to bear
some of the cost of the debtor’s insolvency.235 Some argue that the statute and

230 This Comment does not address the issue of whether a court should enforce an insolvent firm’s
promise that it will not file for bankruptcy.
231 See Warren & Westbrook, supra note 192, at 1221.
232 Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach, supra note 191, at 1815.
233 See S. Todd Brown, Non-Pecuniary Interests and the Injudicious Limits of Appellate Standing in
Bankruptcy, 59 BAYLOR L. REV. 569 (2007); Nathalie D. Martin, Noneconomic Interests in Bankruptcy:
Standing on the Outside Looking In, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 429 (1998); Matthew L. Seror, Note, Analyzing the
Inadequacies of Employee Protections in Bankruptcy, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 141 (2003); Travis J.
Ketterman, The Impact of an Employer’s Bankruptcy on Employees, ILL. B.J., June 2006, at 304.
234 See Brown, supra note 233; Martin, supra note 233; Seror, supra note 233; Ketterman, supra note 233.
235 Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach, supra note 191, at 1815.
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the courts do an equally poor job of considering the interests of third parties,
such as employees and involuntary tort claimants.236
The argument for the interests of the community asserts that the
contractualist position focuses too much on creating an efficient market for
lenders and borrowers before insolvency and not enough on the effects of
insolvency when it happens.237 According to this view, contractualists wrongly
favor looking to the ex ante effects of bankruptcy, like minimizing the cost of
credit, over the ex post effects, like discharge of debt owed to involuntary
creditors, such as tort claimants.238 This objection encompasses the interests of
the community because involuntary creditors such as employees and mass-tort
claimants would not be taken into account since they would never have the
opportunity to contract with a debtor over what to do in the case of the debtor’s
insolvency.239
The objection also applies to the voluntary creditor who contracts with a
debtor to avoid bankruptcy. Pointing to empirical evidence that borrowers and
lenders do not always act rationally and do not have access to all relevant
information on the impact of a default, critics argue that creditors—especially
small, nonbank lenders—would not be able to make contracts that adequately
address the effects of the debtor’s insolvency.240 In other words,
unsophisticated creditors and debtors would not be able to protect their
interests because they are unlikely to have access to all relevant information
concerning the debtor’s insolvency, and research in the field of behavioral
economics indicates that they would not act rationally even if they did have
access to all such information.241 Thus, legislation is the preferable solution to
a debtor’s insolvency because it is the best way to take into account the effects
of insolvency on all affected parties.242
Even if enforcing an SPE’s promise not to file for bankruptcy would not
affect the rights of other creditors, there is still the issue of the interests of
other third parties that may be affected by not allowing the result from In re
General Growth. By most accounts, the General Growth reorganization was a
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success, and many of the properties that General Growth owns and operates
throughout the country were able to remain in business.243
In the long run, however, it would be preferable to ensure that the SPE
structure remains a viable option for lenders in the commercial real estate
market. The bankruptcy-remoteness of any commercial real estate borrower is
crucial to the success of CMBS lending.244 The value of each security is related
to the risk that an individual mortgager will default on its mortgage.245 The
ratings agencies that value CMBS require that a CMBS borrower own only the
mortgaged property and have no debt except for the mortgage.246 This is
because a “central goal” of the securitization process is to ensure that a
bankruptcy court does not interfere with the debtor’s obligation to repay the
loan.247 The result in In re General Growth is the worst case scenario for
lenders that wish to participate in the CMBS market because a court order to
use one SPE’s cash collateral to finance the obligations of the parent or of
other subsidiaries essentially nullifies the separateness covenants on which the
lender first based its decision to lend to the SPE. For the lender, these
separateness covenants are really just a roundabout way of ensuring that the
SPE will not end up in bankruptcy. In a world where the SPE could make an
enforceable promise to stay out of bankruptcy, lenders would have more
certainty that an SPE would not default on its loan, which would in turn make
it easier to market securities made up of the SPEs’ mortgages and would
enable borrowers to get more favorable terms from CMBS lenders, who could
be more confident in repayment.248
There is evidence that preserving and improving the CMBS market would
bring great benefit to the third parties and to the community at large by
strengthening the real estate market.249 The CMBS market allows new
investors to contribute capital to the real estate market by investing in
securities that otherwise would not want to take the risk of financing individual
mortgages.250 Additionally, it allows lenders, by selling off commercial
243 General Growth Properties’ Reorganization Plan Is Approved, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2010,
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/21/business/la-fi-general-growth-20101021.
244 See Brown, supra note 201, at 132; Bankruptcy and the Downfall of Securitization, supra note 92.
245 Amended Amici Brief, supra note 141, at 5.
246 Brown, supra note 201, at 132.
247 Id.
248 Amended Amici Brief, supra note 141, at 5.
249 See Georgette Chapman Phillips, The Paradox of Commercial Real Estate Debt, 42 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 335, 335 (2009).
250 Amended Amici Brief, supra note 141, at 5.
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mortgages, to convert their long-term assets into short-term ones, thus making
the lending a more attractive source of income for them.251 The total value of
the CMBS market is $800 billion, or approximately one-half of all commercial
real estate acquisitions.252 In 2007, the amount of credit created for individual
property owners by the CMBS market was valued at $230 billion, which was
40% of the debt capital that was given to commercial and multifamily real
estate owners that year.253 Some have argued that CMBS played a key role in
pulling the real estate market out of the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s.254
Finally, while the argument from the interests of the community may be
compelling in some circumstances, it carries little weight in the specific case of
SPEs like those at issue in In re General Growth.255 At least some of the SPEs
were not in financial distress and had not defaulted on their loans.256 Thus, the
customers, employees, and suppliers of General Growth’s shopping centers
had nothing to fear from business going on as usual. In fact, allowing
financially healthy SPEs into bankruptcy would be worse for those third parties
because it would divert some of the SPEs’ cash flow to the parent’s
reorganization.
There may be reason to worry that allowing SPEs to waive their right to
bankruptcy eligibility could have adverse effects on some third parties that
might benefit from having those SPEs in bankruptcy. On the other hand, the
failure of the CMBS market is a “potentially catastrophic event” for the
economy.257 The SPE structure is an important aspect of the CMBS market,
and the adverse effects of keeping SPEs out of bankruptcy should be weighed
against the substantial positive impacts that CMBS have on the national real
estate market.258
One can imagine the following objection to the enforcement of a promise
by a solvent SPE not to file bankruptcy. Those entities, in order to circumvent
that rule, might violate the separateness covenants they have made with their
251

Brown, supra note 201, at 135.
Id. at 108; Ken Miller, Using Letters of Credit, Credit Default Swaps and Other Forms of Credit
Enhancements in Net Lease Transactions, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 45, 46 (2009).
253 Amended Amici Brief, supra note 141, at 5.
254 Yevgeniya Drobitskaya, TALF and Revenue Procedure 2009-45: New Hope for the Commercial
Mortgage-Backed Securities Market?, 29 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 41, 41–42 (2009); see also Amended Amici
Brief, supra note 141, at 5.
255 In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
256 See id. at 58; Prudential Insurance Company’s Objection, supra note 11, at 5.
257 Brown, supra note 201, at 108; see also Phillips, supra note 249, at 335.
258 See Amended Amici Brief, supra note 141, at 5.
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lender and incur other debt just so that they can get the protections offered by
the Code. Indeed, the In re General Growth opinion indicates that some of
General Growth’s SPEs had been guaranteeing the debt of other entities and
making intercompany loans.259 Once an SPE has multiple creditors, the force
of the argument that they should be denied the protections of the Code begins
to dissipate.
For this rule to be successful, courts would have to refuse to give effect to
an SPE’s attempt to violate its separateness covenants. An analogy can be
made to the treatment given to enforceable stock transfer restrictions. A lender
that has negotiated for separateness covenants is in a similar position to a
corporation that has placed restrictions on the transferability of its shares in
that it is unlikely to be satisfied by enforcement of its rights through an action
for damages.260 Such a corporation wants to be financially compensated for the
transfer of its shares; it also wants to keep its shares in the hands of a small
group of defined shareholders.261 Similarly, an SPE’s lender has no use for
damages as a remedy for an SPE’s violation of its covenants because it is
really negotiating for the assurance that the SPE will not end up in
bankruptcy.262 These parties do not need “liability rules,” which allow their
rights to be infringed upon if the SPE is willing to pay sufficient value for it.
Rather, they need a restriction on alienability where the transaction they are
trying to prevent will not be recognized even between two willing parties.263
In corporate law, when a valid share transfer restriction has been violated,
courts have been willing to set aside such transactions and treat them as if they
had not occurred.264 Nonbankruptcy courts would have to be willing to give
259

Gen. Growth, 409 B.R. at 58.
See Carrie A. Platt, Comment, The Right of First Refusal in Involuntary Sales and Transfers by
Operation of Law, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 1197, 1207–08 (1996) (“[S]hare transfer restrictions, specifically the
right of first refusal, are extremely important to businesses, particularly closely-held corporations that are
generally characterized by the following attributes: (1) the shareholders are few in number, often only two or
three; (2) they usually live in the same geographical area, know each other, and are well acquainted with each
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HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL’S CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.08, at 31 (3d. ed. 1994))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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262 See McInerney, supra note 8, at 9; supra note 104 and accompanying text.
263 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
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similar treatment to attempts by SPEs to incur other debt or guarantee the debt
of related entities if the rule proposed by this Comment is to be successful.
CONCLUSION
The General Growth bankruptcy raises a host of issues about the nature and
purpose of bankruptcy law. All the parties in the case of General Growth—the
lenders, the borrowers, and the bankruptcy judge—were operating under an
assumption that an entity is prohibited from waiving its right to file bankruptcy
and that any attempt to do so should be subject to close scrutiny. This
assumption has been present in the case law and in scholarly literature for
decades, but many argue that it is not clear where it came from or whether or it
makes sense. Why should a firm not be able to waive its right to file
bankruptcy? Where does the right to file for bankruptcy come from in the first
place? These questions have inspired a lively scholarly debate, especially over
the last twenty years.
This Comment argues that the SPEs at issue in In re General Growth
present a unique case that has not been fully addressed in the literature on the
enforceability of waivers of bankruptcy privileges.265 Most of this literature
focuses on the typical bankruptcy case, where an insolvent firm enters
bankruptcy because its liabilities have so far exceeded its assets that it needs
the protection of the Code in order to continue operating. However, this is not
the only situation in which a firm might file for bankruptcy. The case law is
clear: a firm need not be insolvent in order to file,266 and indeed many of the
SPEs in In re General Growth were not insolvent when they filed their own
petitions.267 Moreover, the Court gave no effect to the SPEs’ attempts prefiling
to organize themselves as “bankruptcy-remote.”
There does not seem to be a clear reason why the conventional wisdom on
the nonenforceability of bankruptcy waivers should apply to firms operating as
SPEs. SPEs have only one creditor, and thus there is little risk of prejudice to
other parties from enforcement of such a waiver. Moreover, allowing the SPE
to enter bankruptcy deprives the creditor of the rights that it bargained for
during the lending process. Finally, the SPE structure is crucial to the
securitization process, which allows capital to flow into the commercial real
265

In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
See, e.g., Caplin v. Marine-Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416, 423 (1972) (“Chapter X
proceedings are not limited to insolvent corporations . . . .”).
267 Gen. Growth, 409 B.R. 43.
266

PEARCE GALLEYSFINAL

2012]

6/8/2012 9:00 AM

BANKRUPTCY-REMOTE SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES

545

estate market. In the future, courts should enforce bankruptcy waivers by
solvent SPEs.
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